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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Randi Marvidikis Hales, daughter of the owner of the Appellant 
corporation, Hales Sand and Gravel, died July 31,1986. Since her death 
occurred in the course of her employment, and since she left no dependents, 
the Appellant was ordered to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
The order was entered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a). 
If the commission has made a determination that there are no 
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to the lapse of one year from 
the date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for 
the employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall 
thereafter be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after 
reaching the initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into 
either the Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may 
be required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers* Fund at or near 
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced 
by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or due the 
deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a dependency 
claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter, 
a determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award 
shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the employer or 
insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted against the 
employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is filed within one 
year from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall 
become permanent and final. If no temporary order has been issued and 
no claim for dependency has been filed within one year from the date of 
death, the commission may issue a permanent order at any time 
requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into the Second Injury 
Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent must be filed with the 
commission within one year from the date of death of the deceased. 
This statute provides that an employer or the employer's insurance carrier may 
be required to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund should an 
employee die without dependents. The $30,000 becomes a mandatory 
payment if the amount in either the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second 
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Injury Fund falls below $500,000. A statutory funeral allowance of $1,800 is 
also required. 
The Appellant filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Industrial 
Commission challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 
(2)(a). Appellant claimed this statute unduly burdens the corporation and others 
similarly situated in that the corporation is required to stand the cost of 
insurance coverage for uninsured employers and consequently subsidize his 
competitors in the marketplace. | 
The Industrial Commission denied Appellant's Motion for Review and 
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge requiring payment. 
Appellant brings this appeal as a result of that affirmation. 
Subsequent to these actions, through the efforts of the Appellant, the 
legislature repealed the statutory provision under which the payment was 
ordered. House Bill No. 208,1987 General Session. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND REAL NATURE AND INCIDENTS OF THE NO 
DEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT SUBSTANTIATE THE TAX STATUS OF THE 
BENEFIT. 
A "tax" has been defined as," an enforced contribution of money or other 
property by authority of a sovereign state from persons or property within its 
jurisdiction for the purpose of defraying the public expenses." Garrett Freight 
Lines. Inc.. v. State Tax Commission. 103 Utah 390,135 P.2d 523 (Utah 1943). 
A tax is determined to be such not depending particularly on the name given it 
but, more precisely by the legislative intent and its real nature and the incidents 
thereof. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization. 166 
P.2d917(Ca. 1946). 
Respondent cites the cases of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp.. 
113 Utah 415,196 P.2d 487 (Utah 1948), and Star v. Industrial Commission. 
615 P.2d 436 (Utah 1980), as support for the theory that payment of the no 
dependent death benefit into the Uninsured Employers' Fund is not a tax, but 
rather compensation. In Henrie. the nondependent father whose son was killed 
on the job claimed that payment of the death benefit into the state treasury was 
not compensation as the term was used in Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution because it did not benefit him. Mr. Henrie maintained, therefore, 
that he was entitled to sue Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation for wrongful 
death. The Court found that compensation was payable to dependents only 
and did not require payment to or for the benefit of nondependent parents. The 
Court further found that no dependent death benefits were compensation in that 
they were not only paid out for workmen and their dependents, but also for 
disability payments, death benefits, medical, hospital and burial expenses, and 
other payments as provided by the Act. Star also dealt with a nondependent 
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parent challenging the payment of the death benefit into the special fund and 
Henrie was cited as support. 
In spite of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has intimated through its 
findings in Henrie and Star that no dependent death benefit payments into the 
special funds are compensation, it is obvious that such findings did not 
consider, nor was it necessary under the particular facts, that these payments 
were a tax. Rather, the Court was defining compensation so as to preclude 
wrongful death recoveries. 
In order to determine if the no dependent death benefit is indeed a tax, 
the legislative intent must be acknowledged. In fttar. the Court referred to 
tlenrja in stating: 
[T]he compensation acts were intended to secure workmen and 
their dependents (not heirs and personal representatives) against 
becoming objects of charity, by making reasonable compensation for 
calamities incidental to the employment and to include these ensuing 
expenses as part of the cost of production. 
Supia, at p. 438. 
The intent then was to compensate employees and their dependents for injury 
and death and thereby prevent their dependence on charity and welfare. There 
can be no doubt that the legislature did not intend that the state would be 
compensated. Therefore, payments made from the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund could be compensation, but payments made into the Fund could not 
conceivably be compensation. Rather, the no dependent death benefit is paid 
into the Fund in the form of a tax, although it may not be specifically referred to 
as such. The real nature of the payment is that it is an enforced contribution by 
the State on employers for a public purpose, namely to compensate workmen 
and their dependents so that they will not have to depend on welfare. 
That the benefit paid by the Appellant into the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund is a taxing measure is further substantiated by how that money is spent. 
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As per Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -107(2), the funds are not only used to 
compensate workers and their dependents, but also to pay the costs of 
administration. Further, Respondent states in its brief, "the Industrial 
Commission investigates over 4,000 suspected uninsured employers yearly 
since the creation of the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided the funding 
necessary to conduct those investigations." The sheer volume of these 
investigations amounts to a sizable cost, and surely the Court could not find 
such expenditures are compensation to workmen or their dependents. The 
Uninsured Employers' Fund is taxing employers to support the functions of 
government and to compensate workmen and their dependents. That 
payments into the Fund purport to be compensation should not prevent this 
Court from calling a "tax" a "tax" when presented with all the facts. 
POINT II: THE NO DEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT AS AN APPROPRIATE EXERCISE OF THE 
STATE'S POLICE POWER MUST ABIDE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES. 
Appellant does not argue that the State, under its police powers, has the 
right to set up an Uninsured Employers' Fund. Appellant does argue that 
requiring an employer to pay into such a fund upon the fortuitous circumstance 
that an employee dies without dependents is not a reasonable basis for 
classification and does, therefore, violate the principles of equal protection. 
Appellant also argues that requiring payment by insured, solvent employers into 
a fund created to benefit the employees of insolvent or uninsured employers is 
discriminatory and, therefore, adverse to equal protection principles. 
Respondent cites the case of Salt Lake Citv v. Industrial Commission. 58 
Utah 314,199 P.152 (Utah 1921) to support its contention that the no 
dependent death benefit is not a denial of equal protection. The facts and 
circumstances involved in that case are very different from those in the case at 
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bar. In Salt Lake City, the Plaintiff was required to pay the no dependent death 
benefit because he was not insured by the State Insurance Fund. The Court 
found no discrimination as the State had made a large financial contribution to 
industries employing labor when it could have put all of the burden back on 
industry. The Court further observed that the Plaintiff had a choice as to 
whether to be self-insured or to insure through the State fund. 
In the instant case and under the law as it existed when Appellant's case 
was brought, the no dependent death benefit was required of all employers 
whose employees died without dependents. Therefore, there was no choice as 
to whether Appellant would be subject to payment into the Uninsured 
Employers* Fund. Further, the discrimination in the instant case was not in favor 
of the State, but rather in favor of employees whose employers were either 
insolvent or have no insurance. 
The payment of no dependent death benefits was upheld as 
constitutional in both United Air Lines Transport Corporation, et al. v. Industrial 
Commission, et al.. 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591 (Utah 1944), and Sheehan v. 
Shuler. 265 U.S. 371, 44 S. Ct. 548, 68 LEd. 1061 (1924). However, the funds 
in these two cases, the Combined Injury Fund in United and funds for 
additional compensation due to permanent total disability and for vocational 
education in Sheehan. were created to benefit the employees of all employers. 
In analyzing the basis for the Uninsured Employers' Fund in the instant case, it 
cannot be ignored that this Fund was established to benefit only those 
employees whose employers are insolvent or uninsured. Further, although all 
employers are required to pay into the Fund when an employee dies without 
dependents, it is doubtful that an insolvent or uninsured employer will indeed 
have the means to pay the no dependent death benefit. Therefore, the solvent, 
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insured employer ends up bearing most, if not all, of the burden for the 
employees of insolvent, uninsured employers. 
Respondent cites several sections from Utah Code Annotated to support 
the theory that insolvent or uninsured employers are subject to liability for 
injuries to their employees in at least as great a degree as are those employers 
who are solvent and insured. Specifically, Respondent cites Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-107(1) and (3) which creates the Uninsured Employers' Fund and also 
provides the Fund with subrogation rights as to the insolvent employer when the 
Fund pays benefits to the employee. While such provisions appear to equalize 
the positions of the solvent, insured employers and the insolvent, uninsured 
employers, it is in theory only. In practice, it is unlikely that the State or the 
employee will be able to collect anything from the insolvent employer as the 
very existence of his insolvency makes him judgment proof. Therefore, 
provisions for collecting payments from insolvent, uninsured employers do not 
equalize the positions of the solvent and insolvent employers in reality. 
Home Ace. Ins. Co.. et al. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, et al.. 269 
P.501 (Az. 1928), is cited by Respondent as authority for the idea that the no 
dependent death benefit is an occupational tax rather than a tax on property 
and, as such, is not subject to constitutional limitations. This case is also used 
to refute Appellant's argument that a no dependent death benefit is 
discriminatory and arbitrary as supported by People v. Yosemite Lumber Co.. 
216 P. 39 (Ca. 1923). 
That the tax imposed by way of the no dependent death benefit in the 
instant case may be an occupational tax as opposed to a tax on property is 
irrelevant as occupational taxes are also subject to constitutional limitations in 
that they must be "uniform, fair, and equitable, bearing alike on all persons and 
subjects embraced in the same class and in similar circumstances." 16C C.J.S. 
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Constitutional Law §890. In Home Ace. Ins. Co.. the Arizona Court stated that 
the purpose of the exaction was "not to meet the currerit expenses of 
government, but to recompense employees of the industries on whom the 
burden is imposed for injuries received by them while engaged in the pursuit of 
their employments." Home Ace. Supra at p. 505. The tax in that case was to be 
paid into the rehabilitation fund of the State for the benefit of all employees. 
This again is very different from the tax imposed in the instant case which is not 
only used to recompense employees of insolvent and uninsured employers, but 
to pay the costs of administration and of investigating suspected uninsured 
employers. Therefore, the exactions imposed in the case at bar axe, used "to 
meet the current expenses of government." 
In distinouishino Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission. 
204 P. 226, (Ca. 1922), Respondent correctly points out that the case dealt with 
a statute that exceeded the authority granted by the California Constitution. 
Nonetheless, the Court found that the unconstitutional act was a taxing law 
irrespective of the fact that it exceeded constitutional authority in that the funds 
were to be used for the vocational re-education of workmen not connected in 
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any way with some of the employers who were required to pay into the fund. 
Further, the surplus of the fund was to be used by the Industrial Accident 
Commission for administrative costs. That situation is analogous to the instant 
case in every respect save that of exceeding constitutional authority which, 
ultimately, is beside the point. 
In People v. Yosemite Lumber Company. 216 P. 39 (Ca. 1923), the 
California Court was asked to determine whether their prior decision in 
Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission served to render nugatory the 
remaining provision of the Act in question. The Court again found that "a 
compulsory payment of a definite sum by a certain class of persons known as 
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employers" was "a charge upon persons or property" and that the purpose of 
the fund was public in that it benefited persons in the state disabled in industry. 
Therefore, the imposition was a tax. Supra at p. 42. 
The California Court also held that the classification supporting the Act 
was unreasonable in that it was based on a "purely adventitious condition," 
namely, that an employer should have an employee die without dependents. 
This classification was found to be unreasonable in light of the above and 
particularly in that the proceeds of the tax were to be devoted to the benefit "not 
of the employers required to pay the tax, nor even of their employees, but to the 
benefit and betterment of a class of persons bearing no relation to either,..." 
Sypia at p. 43. 
In the instant case, all employers are required to pay into the Uninsured 
Employers'Fund when an employee dies with no dependents. This no 
dependent death benefit has been held to be constitutional where the Fund to 
be benefited thereby is for the betterment of all employees in general. This 
benefit has not, however, been held to be constitutional where it is for the 
employees of one class of employers, the insolvent and uninsured, and where 
solvent, insured employers are compelled to pay into a Fund which will benefit 
a class of persons to which they have no relation. Therefore, it is not only the 
unreasonableness of the classification alone that thwarts constitutional 
obligations in this situation, but rather the unreasonable classification in 
conjunction with the discriminatory application; the solvent, insured employer 
bearing, in reality if not in theory, the entire burden for employees of insolvent, 
uninsured employers. 
CONCLUSION 
Payment of the no dependent death benefit by solvent, insured 
employers into the Uninsured Employers' Fund for the benefit of the employees 
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of insolvent, uninsured employers is unreasonable and discriminatory. 
Therefore, the ruling of the Industrial Commission must be overturned. 
DATED THIS of July, 1987. 
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